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Abstract
We study a problem involving a set of organizations. Each organization has its own pool of clients who either supply
or demand one unit of an indivisible product. Knowing the profit induced by each buyer/seller pair, an organization’s
task is to conduct such transactions within its database of clients in order to maximize the amount of the transactions.
Inter-organizations transactions are allowed: in this situation, two clients from distinct organizations can trade and their
organizations share the induced profit. Since maximizing the overall profit leads to unacceptable situations where an
organization can be penalized, we study the problem of maximizing the overall profit such that no organization gets less
than it can obtain on its own. Complexity results, an approximation algorithm and a matching inapproximation bound
are given.
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1. Introduction
We are given a two-sided assignment market
(B,S,A) defined by a set of buyers B, a disjoint set of
sellers S, and a nonnegative matrix A = (aij)(i,j)∈B×S
where aij represents a profit if the pair (i, j) ∈ B × S
trades. In this market products come in indivisible units,
and each participant either supplies or demands exactly
one unit. The units need not be alike and the same unit
may have different values for different participants.
We study a problem involving a set of organizations
{O1, . . . , Oq} which forms a partition of the market.
A buyer (resp. seller) is a client of exactly one orga-
nization. It is assumed that for every transaction (i, j),
the organizations of i and j make an overall profit aij
which is divided between the seller’s organization and
the buyer’s organization as follows. The seller’s orga-
nization receives ps aij while the buyer’s organization
gets pb aij , where ps and pb are fixed numbers between
0 and 1 and such that pb + ps = 1. Thus aij is a sort of
commission that these two organizations divide accord-
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ing to pb and ps. We assume without loss of generality
that 0 ≤ pb ≤ ps ≤ 1 (if the profit of the buyer is larger
than the profit of the seller, then we rename pb into ps
and the other way around). Moreover, we consider in
this paper values such that ps + pb = 1.
In this model, buyers and sellers do not make pairs
by themselves, but these pairs are formed by their orga-
nizations. Each organization acts as a selfish agent who
only knows its list of clients and only cares about its
profit. Thus, each organization Oi shall maximize the
weight of a matching on its own list of clients (this task
can be done in polynomial time for example by using
the Hungarian method [9]). However the global profit
can be better if transactions between clients of distinct
organizations are allowed. This leads to a situation of
cooperation where the agents accept to disclose their
lists of clients by reporting them to a trusted entity. This
trusted entity can conduct transactions between a buyer
and a seller from distinct organizations, and of course,
it can also do it for two clients of the same organization.
The trusted entity shall maximize the collective profits.
However, maximizing the collective profits by returning
a maximum weight matching may lead to unacceptable
situations: each organization is selfish so it does not
want to cooperate if its profit is worse than it could ob-
tain on its own. The optimization problem faced by the
trusted entity is then to maximize the collective profit
so that no organization is penalized.
c© 2013 Preeminent Academic Facets Inc., Canada. Online version: http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/AOR. All rights reserved.
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1.1. The MultiOrganization Assignment problem
MOA
The market is modelled by a weighted bipartite graph
G = (B,S;E;w) and q sets (representing the organi-
zations) O1, . . . , Oq forming a partition of B ∪ S. Ev-
ery buyer (resp. seller) is represented by a vertex in
B (resp. S), E ⊆ B × S is the edge set representing
pairs and w : E → R+ is a nonnegative weight func-
tion. The subgraph of G induced by Oi is denoted by
Gi. We have Gi = (Bi, Si;Ei;w) where Bi = B ∩Oi
and Si = S ∩ Oi. A set M ⊆ E is an assignment (or
a matching) if and only if each vertex in (B,S;M ;w)
has degree at most one. The weight of an assignment
M (i.e. the sum of the weights of its edges) is denoted
by w(M), and the profit of organization Oi in M is
denoted by wi(M) and defined as
wi(M) =
∑
{[x,y]∈M : (x,y)∈Bi×S}
pb w([x, y])
+
∑
{[x,y]∈M : (x,y)∈B×Si}
ps w([x, y])
where ps and pb are two nonnegative rational num-
bers such that ps + pb = 1 and 0 ≤ pb ≤ ps ≤ 1.
We say that an edge whose endpoints are in the same
organization (resp. in distinct organizations) is inter-
nal (resp. shared). Let G˜ be the graph G in which we
removed all the shared edges. The maximum weight
matching of G˜ is denoted by M˜ (i.e. M˜ is the maximum
weight matching of G reduced to its internal edges).
Let M˜i be the restriction of M˜ to Gi. The multior-
ganization assignment problem (MOA for short) is to
find a maximum weight matching M of G such that
wi(M) ≥ wi(M˜) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Here wi(M˜)
is what organization Oi can get on its own. Then M˜ is
a feasible solution to the MOA problem. As a notation,
M∗ denotes a maximum weight matching ofG whereas
M∗MOA is an optimum for MOA.
1.2. Applications
We give here two applications where MOA arises.
1.2.1. The “agencies problem”
Each organization has its own pool of sellers (S) and
buyers (B) who either supply or demand one unit of an
indivisible product. Consider for example that organi-
zations are real estate agencies. Each organization re-
ceives a commission on each transaction it deals, and
its goal is to maximize its profit. Therefore each organi-
zation accepts the assignment given by a trusted entity
if and only if its profit is at least equal to the profit it
would have had without sharing its file with the other
organizations. The overall aim is then to find an assign-
ment which maximizes the total amount of transactions
done, while guaranting that no organization decreases
its profit by sharing its file.
1.2.2. A scheduling example
Each organization (which can be a university, labora-
tory, etc.) owns unit tasks (given by its users), and sev-
eral (possibly different) machines. During some given
time slots, the machines are available to schedule the
tasks of the users. Each user gives her preferences for
a given machine and a given time slot. These prefer-
ences are represented by integers (aij) between 0 (a
task cannot be scheduled on this machine at this time),
and a given upper bound. The goal of each organiza-
tion is to maximize the average satisfaction of its users,
represented by the sum of the satisfactions of its users
divided by the number of users, in the returned assign-
ment. Therefore an organization will accept a multior-
ganization assignment if and only if the average satis-
faction of its users is at least as high as when the orga-
nization accepts only the tasks from its users. Here, an
unmatched user’s satisfaction is 0. This corresponds to
MOA when S is the set of users, B the set of couples
(time slot, machine), ps = 1 and pb = 0.
1.3. Related work
The multi-organization assignment problem is a vari-
ant of the classical assignment problem (see [17] for a
recent survey). Besides its combinatorial structure, MOA
involves self-interested agents whose cooperation can
lead to significant improvements but a solution is fea-
sible only if it does not harm any local utility.
Non cooperative game theory studies situations in-
volving several players whose selfish actions affect each
other [13]. In Tucker’s prisoner’s dilemma, two play-
ers can either cooperate (C), i.e. stay loyal to the other
prisoner, or defect (D), i.e. agree to testify against the
other.
Table 1
C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
the prisoner’s dilemma
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A social optimum is reached if both play C but the
situation where both prisoners defect is the only stable
situation (a Nash equilibrium). In fact, the game de-
signer of the prisoner’s dilemma filled the payoff matrix
in way such that any prisoner has an incentive to defect.
MOA models the opposite situation where the game de-
signer tries to fill the payoff matrix such that each orga-
nization’s (weakly) dominant strategy is to cooperate,
i.e. to disclose its list of clients and follow the trusted
entity. The game designer has to compute a Nash equi-
librium (a stable matching) that optimizes the social
welfare (total profit).
The maximum weight matchingM∗ is sometimes un-
stable because the organizations are selfish. Then, one
has to consider a different optimum M∗MOA which is
the maximum weight Nash equilibrium (no organiza-
tion can increase its profit by using its own maximum
weight matching instead of the solution returned by the
trusted entity). Interestingly, a theoretical measure of
this loss of profit due to the selfishness of the organiza-
tions exists. Known as the price of stability (PoS) [19,2],
it is defined as the (worst case) ratio between the most
socially valuable state and the value of the best Nash
equilibrium. For MOA, PoS= w(M∗MOA)/w(M∗).
MOA is related to cooperative game theory [13]. A
central issue in this field is to allocate the value of a
coalition to its members. Shapley and Shubik associate
to any two-sided assignment market (B,S,A) a coop-
erative game with transferable utility (the assignment
game) and show that its core is nonempty and has a
lattice structure [20].
MOA is close in spirit to other works which study, at
an algorithmic level, how to make organizations coop-
erate. In [15,6], the authors study a scheduling problem
involving several organizations. Each of them has a set
of jobs to be completed as early as possible and its own
set of processors. A selfish schedule is such that the
processors only execute jobs of their owner. The au-
thors propose algorithms which return schedules with
good makespans and in which the organizations coop-
erate without being penalized. In [11,10], the authors
study the selfish distributed replication problem. This
problem involves several nodes of a network whose task
is to fetch electronic contents (objects) located at dis-
tant servers. Instead of taking an object from its server
at each request, the nodes can save time by making a
local copy. An intermediate strategy is to get an object
from another node which is closer than the server. The
optimization problem is to fill the (bounded) memory
of each node in order to minimize the overall expected
response time. Since an optimum solution can be unac-
ceptable to selfish nodes (e.g. a node’s memory is filled
with objects that it rarely requests), the authors of [10]
propose equilibrium placement strategies where no one
is penalized.
1.4. Contribution
We investigate the computational complexity of MOA
in Section 2.. In particular, we show that the problem is
strongly NP-hard if the number of organizations if not
fixed. It is weakly NP-hard for two organizations. A pos-
sible proof of strong NP-hardness for a fixed number of
organizations is discussed and some pseudo-polynomial
and polynomial cases are given as well. We provide an
approximation algorithm with performance guarantee
pb and a matching proof of inapproximation in Section
3.. We also show in this section that the price of stability
of MOA is pb. Section 4. deals with connections between
MOA and the multicriteria matching problem. Section
5. is devoted to generalizations of MOA and also gener-
alizations of the results of this article. We conclude in
Section 6..
2. Complexity results
We prove that MOA is strongly NP-hard in the gen-
eral case. We also show that the restriction of MOA to 2
organizations is weakly NP-hard. Next we show pseu-
dopolynomial and polynomial cases.
2.1. Computationally hard cases
Let ps and pb be two numbers such that 1 ≥ ps ≥
pb ≥ 0 and ps + pb = 1. Given a positive profit P
and an instance of MOA, the decision version asks
whether the instance admits a matching M such that
∀i∈{1,...,q} wi(M) ≥ w(M˜i) and w(M) ≥ P .
Theorem 1. The decision version of MOA is strongly
NP-complete for every values ps and pb.
Proof. Let ps and pb be two numbers such that 1 ≥
ps ≥ pb ≥ 0 and ps + pb = 1. Given a positive profit
P and an instance of MOA, the decision version asks
whether the instance admits a matching M such that
∀i∈{1,...,q} wi(M) ≥ w(M˜i) and w(M) ≥ P .
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Fig. 1. Bipartite graph obtained by the transformation of
an instance I = {a1, . . . , a6} of the 3-PARTITION problem
where W = 1
2
∑
6
j=1
aj . There is an edge with weight aj
between b3,j and sx,y for all pairs (x, y) ∈ {1, 2}×{1, 2, 3}.
These edges are shaded in the picture except those with weight
a1.
Given a bound W , a set A = {a1, . . . , a3m} of 3m
positive integers such that
∑3m
i=1 ai = mW and ∀i =
1, . . . , 3m, W4 < ai <
W
2 , the 3-PARTITION problem is
to decide whether A can be partitioned into m subsets
A1, A2, . . . , Am such that the sum of the numbers in
each subset is equal (thus ∑aj∈Ai aj = W and |Ai| =
3 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). The 3-PARTITION problem
is strongly NP-complete (problem [SP15] in [7]).
Given an instance I of the 3-PARTITION problem,
we build a corresponding instance I ′ of MOA as follows
(see Figure 1 for an illustration):
• we are given m+1 organizations O1, . . . ,Om+1, i.e.
q = m+ 1
• Om+1 has 3m buyers and m sellers respectively de-
noted by bm+1,1 to bm+1,3m and sm+1,1 to sm+1,m
• for i = 1, . . . ,m: Oi has 3 sellers denoted by si,1,
si,2, si,3 and one buyer bi
• The edge set is given by {[bi, si,1], [bi, sm+1,i] :
i = 1, . . . ,m} ∪ {[bm+1,j, si,1], [bm+1,j, si,2],
[bm+1,j, si,3] : i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , 3m}}
• for i = 1, . . . ,m: w([bi, si,1]) = w([bi, sm+1,i])
= W
• for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , 3m} :
w([bm+1,j , si,1]) = w([bm+1,j , si,2])
= w([bm+1,j , si,3]) = aj
• P = 2Wm
We have wi(M˜) = (ps + pb)W = W for i =
1, . . . ,m and wm+1(M˜) = 0. We claim that I ′ admits
a feasible assignment M such that w(M) ≥ 2mW if
and only if I admits a partition into m subsets A1, A2,
. . . , Am such that
∑
aj∈Ai
aj = W and |Ai| = 3 for
all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Let Aˆ = 〈A1, A2, . . . , Am〉 be a YES solution to the
instance I of 3-PARTITION. We build a corresponding
matching Mˆ , solution to the instance I ′ of MOA as
follows: Mˆ = ∅ at the beginning and for each triple ax,
ay , az of Ai, we add edges [bm+1,x, si,1], [bm+1,y, si,2]
and [bm+1,z, si,3] to Mˆ . We also add edge [bi, sm+1,i]
to Mˆ for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
We remark that Mˆ is a feasible assignment. Indeed,
organization Oi (i = 1, . . . ,m) has 4 shared edges in
Mˆ , that is [bi, sm+1,i] with weight W , [bm+1,x, si,1]
with weight ax, [bm+1,y, si,2] with weight ay and
[bm+1,z, si,3] with weight az .
Since Aˆ is a YES solution to I , we know that ax+ay+
az = W . Hence, wi(Mˆ) = (ps + pb)W = wi(M˜) for
i = 1, . . . ,m. We also have wm+1(Mˆ) ≥ wm+1(M˜)
since all the weights are nonnegative and wm+1(M˜) =
0. Thus, Mˆ is a YES solution to instance I ′ of the
decision version of MOA because the total profit made
by the organizations is 2mW .
Conversely, let Mˆ be a YES solution to the instance
I ′ of the decision version of MOA with P = 2mW .
By definition we have w(Mˆ ) ≥ 2mW , wi(Mˆ) ≥ W
for i = 1, . . . ,m and wm+1(Mˆ) ≥ 0. Observe that
Mˆ ∩ {[bi, si,1] | i = 1, . . . ,m} = ∅. Indeed, if k
edges in {[bi, si,1] | i = 1, . . . ,m} belong to Mˆ then
the total profit would be strictly less than 2mW since
w(Mˆ ) ≤ kW + (m − k)W +
∑3m
i=1 ai − kmin{ai :
i = 1, . . . , 3m} ≤ (2m− k4 )W < 2mW . Furthermore,
Mˆ must be perfect since otherwise w(Mˆ ) < 2mW .
Indeed, the maximum weight matching has a weight
2mW and it is obtained only if all the edges [bi, sm+1,i]
(with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) are selected and if all the ver-
tices bm+1,j (with j ∈ {1, . . . , 3m}) are saturated by
the matching.
We build a partition Aˆ = 〈A1, A2, . . . , Am〉, solution
to the instance I of 3-PARTITION corresponding to Mˆ
as follows: for i = 1 to m, put in Ai the weight of
the (shared) edges incident to si,1, si,2 and si,3. One
can observe that Aˆ is a feasible 3-partition of I . Take
an organization Oi (i = 1, . . . ,m), 4 shared edges are
incident to its nodes in Mˆ . The one incident to bi has
weight W . The total weight of the three others must be
at least W since wi(M˜) = (ps + pb)W . Hence, each
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Fig. 2. The construction of I ′.
Ai is assigned 3 values whose sum is at least W but if
this sum exceeds W for at least one organization, we
would have
∑3m
j=1 aj > Wm which is a contradiction.
As a consequence, each Ai is assigned 3 values whose
sum is exactly W .
Theorem 2. The decision version of MOA is NP-
complete, for every values ps and pb, even if there are 2
organizations and the underlying graph is of maximum
degree 2.
Proof. Let ps and pb be two reals such that 1 ≥ ps ≥
pb ≥ 0 and ps + pb = 1. The reduction is done from
PARTITION: given a set {a1, . . . , an} of n integers such
that
∑n
i=1 ai = 2W , decide whether there exists J ⊂
{1, . . . , n} such that
∑
j∈J aj = W . PARTITION is
known to be NP-complete (problem [SP12] in [7]).
From an instance I of PARTITION, we build I ′, an
instance of MOA, in the following way:
• we are given 2 organizations O1 and O2
• O1 has n + 1 sellers and n + 1 buyers respectively
denoted by s1,i and b1,i for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1
• O2 has also n+1 buyers and n+1 sellers respectively
denoted by b2,i and s2,i for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1
• The edge set of the underlying graph is given by
{[s1,n+1, b2,n+1]} ∪ {[b2,n+1, s2,n+1]}
∪ {[s2,n+1, b1,n+1]} ∪ {[b1,i, s1,i], [s1,i, b2,i],
[b1,i, s2,i] : i = 1, . . . , n}
The weights are defined by:
• w([b1,i, s1,i]) = 6ai and w([b2,i, s1,i])
= w([s2,i, b1,i]) = 3ai for i = 1, . . . , n
• w([b2,n+1, s2,n+1]) = 6W andw([s1,n+1, b2,n+1]) =
w([b1,n+1, s2,n+1]) = 3W + 1
The underlying graph is made of a collection of n+1
disjoint paths of length 3. Figure 2 gives an illustration
of this construction.
Organization O1 can make a profit w1(M˜) = (ps +
pb)
∑n
i=1 6ai = 12W if it works alone. The local profit
of organization O2 is w2(M˜) = (ps + pb)6W = 6W .
Thus, globally, the weight of this matching is 18W .
We claim that I ′ admits a feasible assignment Mˆ
such that w(Mˆ) ≥ 18W + 2 if and only if I admits a
set J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with
∑
j∈J aj = W .
Let J be a subset of {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
j∈J aj =
W (and then,∑j /∈J aj = W ). We build the assignment
Mˆ as follows:
Mˆ = {[b2,j, s1,j], [s2,j , b1,j] : j ∈ J} ∪ {[b1,j, s1,j ] :
j /∈ J} ∪ {[s1,n+1, b2,n+1], [b1,n+1, s2,n+1]}
Clearly, the cost of Mˆ is given by w(Mˆ) = 18W+2.
Now, let us verify that Mˆ is a feasible solution. The
local profit of organization O1 is (ps+pb)
∑
j /∈J 6aj +
(ps+pb)
∑
j∈J 3aj+(ps+pb)(3W +1) = 12W+1 ≥
w1(M˜) whereas the profit of organization O2 becomes
(ps+pb)
∑
j∈J 3aj +(ps+pb)(3W +1) = 6W +1 ≥
w2(M˜).
Conversely, let Mˆ be a feasible assignment such that
w(Mˆ ) ≥ 18W+2. The following property can be easily
proved.
Property 1. Any optimal solution of MOA can be sup-
posed to be maximal with respect to inclusion. Further-
more any feasible solution of MOA can be completed so
that it can be supposed to be maximal with respect to
inclusion.
Now, remark that Mˆ necessarily contains the edges
[s1,n+1, b2,n+1] and [b1,n+1, s2,n+1] since on the one
hand, the weight of any maximal matching on the graph
induced by all vertices except {s1,n+1, s2,n+1, b1,n+1,
b2,n+1} is 12W , and on the other hand
w([b2,n+1, s2,n+1]) = 6W . Thus, Mˆ must contain
some edges [b2,j , s1,j ] or [b1,j, s2,j ] in order to com-
pensate the loss of the edge [b2,n+1, s2,n+1]. Let J =
{j ≤ n : [b2,j , s1,j] ∈ Mˆ}. By property 1, Mˆ is com-
pletely described by Mˆ = {[b2,j, s1,j], [b1,j , s2,j] : j ∈
J} ∪ {[b1,j, s1,j] : j /∈ J} ∪ {[s1,n+1, b2,n+1], [b1,n+1,
s2,n+1]}.
The profit of organizationO2 is (ps+pb)
∑
j∈J 3aj+
(ps + pb)(3W + 1) = 3
∑
j∈J aj + 3W + 1. Since
that profit is at least w2(M˜) = 6W , we deduce that∑
j∈J aj ≥W −
1
3 . Finally,
∑
j∈J aj must be an inte-
ger, so
∑
j∈J aj ≥W . On the other hand, the profit of
organizationO1 is given by (ps+pb)
∑
j /∈J 6aj+(ps+
pb)
∑
j∈J 3aj + (ps + pb)(3W + 1) = 6
∑n
j=1 aj −
3
∑
j∈J aj + 3W + 1. This quantity must be at least
w1(M˜) = 6
∑n
j=1 aj . Since
∑
j∈J aj is an integer, we
obtain
∑
j∈J aj ≤ W . In conclusion,
∑
j∈J aj = W
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which means that {a1, . . . , an} can be partitioned into
two sets of weight W .
Is MOA strongly NP-complete for two organizations?
We were not able to answer this question but we can re-
late it to another one stated more than 25 years ago and
which is still open: Is the exact weighted perfect match-
ing problem in bipartite graphs strongly NP-complete?
Given a graph whose edges have an integer weight
and given a value W , the problem EXACTPM is to de-
cide whether the graph contains a perfect matching M
of total weight exactly W [3,8,12,14]. Papadimitriou
and Yannakakis [14] prove that EXACTPM is (weakly)
NP-complete in bipartite graphs. Barahona and Pulley-
blank [3] propose a pseudopolynomial algorithm in the
case of planar graphs and Karzanov [8] gives a poly-
nomial algorithm when the graph is either complete or
complete bipartite and the weights are restricted to 0 or
1. Mulmuley, Vazirani and Vazirani [12] show that EX-
ACTPM has a randomized pseudo-polynomial-time al-
gorithm. However, the deterministic complexity of this
problem remains unsettled, even for bipartite graphs
(Papadimitriou and Yannakakis conjectured that it is
strongly NP-complete [14]).
EXACTPM is an auto-reducible problem, that is, find-
ing a perfect matching of weight W is polynomially
equivalent to deciding whether such a matching exists.
Here, we prove that there is a Turing reduction from
MOA when there are 2 organizations to EXACTPM.
Thus, we conclude that if MOA with 2 organizations is
strongly NP-complete then EXACTPM is also strongly
NP-complete in bipartite graphs. Notice that this result
also holds when there is a constant number of organi-
zations.
Proposition 1. If EXACTPM is solvable in polynomial
time in bipartite graphs when weights are polynomially
bounded, then MOA with two organizations and weights
polynomially bounded is polynomial for every values ps
and pb.
Proof. Let pb, ps be two rational numbers such that
1 ≥ ps ≥ pb ≥ 0 and ps + pb = 1, and let I = (G,w)
be an instance of MOA with two organizations where
G = (V,E). W.l.o.g.w(e), psw(e) and pbw(e) are inte-
gers for every edge e ∈ E (otherwise, multiplying each
weight by the denominator of pb if pb 6= 0, we obtain an
equivalent instance). Moreover for all e ∈ E, w(e) ≤
P (|V |) for some polynomialP . LetR be the weight of a
maximum weight matching of G. Consider the bipartite
graph G′ = (V ′, E′) built from G by adding dummy
vertices and edges with weight 0 such that any match-
ing of G can be completed into a perfect matching of G′
with the same value. Formally, we add a copy ofK|S|,|B|
with |S| new B-vertices and B new S-vertices. Each
new B-vertex (resp., S-vertex) is completely linked
to the S-vertices (resp., B-vertices) of G. Then, each
shared edge e = [u, v] ∈ E is replaced by a path of
length 3 [u, ue], [ue, ve], [ve, v] where ue, ve are new
vertices. Note that either {[u, ue], [ve, v]} or {[ue, ve]}
is included in a perfect matching of G′. Consider the
weight function w′ defined as w′(e) = (R + 1)3w(e)
if e is internal to organization O1 and w′(e) = (R +
1)2w(e) if e is internal to organization O2. Moreover,
if e = [u, v] ∈ E is a shared edge then w′([u, ue]) =
(R + 1)psw([u, v]) if u ∈ S ∩ O1 and w′([u, ue]) =
(R + 1)pbw([u, v]) otherwise (i.e. u ∈ B ∩ O1). We
also set w′([v, ve]) = psw([u, v]) if u ∈ S ∩ O2 and
w′([v, ve]) = pbw([u, v]) otherwise. The weight of each
remaining edge of G′ is 0. It is clear that G′ is built
within polynomial time and w′ remains polynomially
bounded. Let I ′ = (G′, w′).
For any matching M , we denote by M1 (resp., M2)
the restriction of M to organization O1 (resp., O2) and
by Mshared the set of shared edges of M . Denote by
W1 (resp., W2) the contribution of the shared edges of
M to the profit of organizationO1 (resp., O2). We have
w(Mshared) = W1 +W2 since ps + pb = 1.
We claim that w(M) = w(M1) + w(Mshared) +
w(M2) if and only if there exists a perfect matching of I ′
with weight W = (R+1)3w(M1)+(R+1)2w(M2)+
(R+1)W1+W2. Moreover,M is a feasible solution to
MOA if and only if w(Mi)+Wi ≥ wi(M˜) for i = 1, 2.
One direction is trivial. So, let M ′ be a matching
of I ′ with value w′(M ′) = W = (R + 1)3A + (R +
1)2B+(R+1)C+D. By the choice of R, we must get
w(M ′1) = A, w(M
′
2) = B and w(M ′shared) = C +D,
where C (resp., D) is the contribution of M ′shared to
the profit of organization O1 (resp., O2). The profit of
organization O1 (resp. O2) according to M ′ is A + C
(resp. B +D).
In conclusion by applying at most R4 times the poly-
nomial algorithm for EXACTPM, we find an optimal
solution of MOA. By an exhaustive search, we try all val-
ues of A,B,C,D at most equal to R such that A+C ≥
w1(M˜) and B +D ≥ w2(M˜).
Proposition 2. MOA with a constant number of orga-
nizations can be solved in pseudopolynomial time when
the underlying graph has a maximum degree of 2.
Proof. Here, we deal with 2 organizations, but the re-
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sult can be extended to any constant number of organi-
zations. The proof is based on Proposition 1, and uses
the pseudopolynomiality result of [3] for EXACTPM
in planar graphs. However, the construction of G′ is
slightly different because when one adds a copy of
K|S|,|B| the resulting graph may be not planar. So, let
I = (G,w) be an instance of MOA with 2 organizations
where G = (V,E) is a bipartite graph of maximum
degree 2. W.l.o.g., assume that G is 2-regular, that is
a collection of disjoint even cycles (by adding dummy
vertices and edges of weight 0). Then, for each cycle C
of G, we add a copy C′ of C and we link each vertex
of C to its copy in C′. Finally, as it is done in Propo-
sition 1, each shared edge e = [u, v] of a cycle C in G
is replaced by a path of length 3 [u, ue], [ue, ve], [ve, v]
where ue, ve are new vertices. The weights are defined
similarly to the ones given in Proposition 1. Figure 3
gives an illustration of this construction.
Obviously, G′ is planar. Moreover, any matching M
can be converted into a perfect matching M ′ of G′.
Thus, by applying the argument given in Proposition 1,
the result follows.
2.2. Polynomial cases
MOA is trivially polynomial when there is a unique
organization or when the underlying graph is of max-
imum degree 1. Furthermore an exhaustive search can
efficiently solve the problem if the underlying graph
G = (V,E) contains O(log |E|) shared edges. Let
MOA0,1 be the subcase where w([i, j]) ∈ {0, 1} for all
(i, j) ∈ B × S. We prove that an optimum to MOA0,1
is a maximum cardinality assignment of the underlying
graph though a maximum cardinality assignment is not
necessarily a solution of MOA0,1.
Theorem 3. MOA0,1 is polynomial.
Proof. Let M be an assignment on an unweighted bi-
partite graph G = (B,S;E). Recall that a path in G
is alternating with respect to M if it alternates edges
of M and edges of E \M . Furthermore, an alternat-
ing path pi is augmenting if no edge of M is incident
to its endpoints. The word “augmenting” means that
(M \ pi) ∪ (pi \M) is a matching of size |M |+ 1. M
is of maximum size on G if G does not admit any aug-
menting alternating path with respect to M (by contra-
diction, if this was not the case, we could increase the
size of M ).
Let I be an instance of MOA0,1 defined upon G. Let
Mˆ be an optimal matching built as follows. Start with
the feasible matching M˜ and increase its size with aug-
menting alternating paths while it is possible.
Let Mˆ j be the matching produced at step j. We
suppose that t steps are needed to obtain Mˆ . Hence,
Mˆ0 = M˜ and Mˆ t = Mˆ . We mainly prove
wi(Mˆ
j+1) ≥ wi(Mˆ
j), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , q} (1)
for all j ∈ {0, . . . , t−1}. This inequality states that the
use of an augmenting alternating path cannot deteriorate
the profit of any organization.
Given v ∈ V and a matching M , let c(v,M) be the
contribution of v to the profit of its organization in M :
c(v,M) =


ps if v ∈ S and an edge of M
is incident to v
pb if v ∈ B and an edge of
M is incident to v
0 otherwise
Let V ′ be the vertices of pi′, the augmenting alternating
path such that Mˆ j+1 = (Mˆ j \ pi′) ∪ (pi′ \ Mˆ j). We
deduce that
wi(Mˆ
j+1)−wi(Mˆ
j) =
∑
v∈V ′
(
c(v, Mˆ j+1)− c(v, Mˆ j)
)
(2)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. One can observe that c(v, Mˆ j) =
c(v, Mˆ j+1) if v ∈ V ′ and v is not an extremal node of
pi′. Indeed, a buyer b ∈ V ′ matched with a seller s ∈ V ′
in Mˆ j is still matched in Mˆ j+1 but with another seller.
Similarly, a seller s ∈ V ′ matched with a buyer b ∈ V ′
in Mˆ j is still matched in Mˆ j+1 but with another buyer.
If v ∈ S ∩ V ′ (resp. v ∈ B ∩ V ′) and v is an extremal
node of pi′ then c(v, Mˆ j) = 0 and c(v, Mˆ j+1) = ps
(resp. c(v, Mˆ j) = 0 and c(v, Mˆ j+1) = pb). Hence,
c(v, Mˆ j+1)− c(v, Mˆ j) ≥ 0 (3)
for all v ∈ V because ps ≥ pb ≥ 0. Using (2)
and (3) we obtain wi(Mˆ j+1) − wi(Mˆ j) ≥ 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Mˆ is a feasible assignment because
wi(Mˆ
t) ≥ wi(Mˆ t−1) ≥ . . . ≥ wi(Mˆ0) = w(M˜i) for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , q} (we recall that M˜ is the maximum
weight matching of G reduced to its internal edges,
and M˜i is the restriction of M˜ to Gi). In addition,
w(Mˆ ) = w(M∗) because the algorithm stops when no
augmenting alternating path exists. In conclusion, Mˆ
is optimal because w(M∗) ≥ w(M∗MOA).
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Fig. 3. Construction of G′ and perfect matching M ′ from G and matching M .
3. Approximation
Recall that ps and pb are any values such that
0 ≤ pb ≤ ps ≤ 1 and ps + pb = 1. We start by the
following property.
Property 2. wi(M∗) ≥ pb w(M˜i), and this bound is
asymptotically tight.
Proof. Let Ci be the set of edges of M∗ which have
at least one endpoint belonging to organization Oi. We
have w(Ci) ≥ w(M˜i), otherwise we could obtain a
matching of weight larger than w(M∗) by replacing
the edges of Ci by the ones of M˜i. The profit of Oi is
wi(M
∗) ≥ pb w(Ci), and thus wi(M∗) ≥ pb w(M˜i).
Let ε be a small positive number. Let us now show
that the above bound is tight, by considering the fol-
lowing instance: there are two organizationsO1 and O2
such that there are in O1 two nodes b1 and s1 linked
by an edge of weight 1 − ε, and there is in O2 one
node s2 linked to b1 by an edge of weight 1. We have:
w(M˜1) = 1− ε, M∗ = {[b1, s2]}, and w1(M
∗)
w(M˜i)
= pb1−ε ,
which tends towards pb when ε tends towards 0.
Let us consider algorithm APPROX given below.
Theorem 4. APPROX is a pb-approximate algorithm
for MOA, and this bound is asymptotically tight.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm APPROX
• Construct the graph G′ = (V ′, E′) from
G = (V,E) as follows: V ′ = V , and E′ = E,
except that the weights of the edges are modified:
for each edge [u, v] such that u belongs to
organization Oi and v belongs to organization Oj ,
w′([u, v]) = w([u, v]) if u and v belong to the
same organization (i = j), and otherwise
w′([u, v]) = pb w([u, v]).
• Return a maximum weight matching of G′.
Proof. Let ps, pb be two numbers such that 1 ≥ ps ≥
pb ≥ 0 and ps + pb = 1. Let M be a matching re-
turned by algorithm APPROX on graph G. We first show
that the profit of each organization Oi in M is at least
w(M˜i). Thus M is a solution of MOA.
Let M int(i) be the set of edges of M such that both
endpoints belong to Oi, and let M ext(i) be the set of
edges of M such that exactly one endpoint belongs
to Oi. Since M is a maximum weight matching of
G′, w′(M int(i)) + w′(M ext(i)) ≥ w′(M˜i) = w(M˜i),
otherwise we could have a matching with a larger
weight by replacing the edges of
(
M int(i) ∪M ext(i)
)
in M by the edges of M˜i. Thus the profit of Oi is at
least w(M int(i)) + pb w(M ext(i)) = w′(M int(i)) +
w′(M ext(i))) ≥ w(M˜i) = wi(M˜).
Let us now show that APPROX is pb-approximate. The
edges ofG′ are the same as the ones ofG, except that the
weight of some of them has been multiplied by pb < 1.
Thus M , which is a maximum weight matching of G′,
has a weight w(M) ≥ pb w(M∗) ≥ pb w(M∗MOA).
Let us show that this bound is asymptotically tight
by considering the following instance. Here, we assume
pb > 0. Recall that pb ≤ 1/2 since 1 ≥ ps ≥ pb ≥ 0.
Let ε > 0 such that ε < 1/pb − 1. There are two or-
ganizations, organization O1, which owns two vertices
b1 and s1, also linked by an edge of weight 1, and
organization O2, which owns two vertices b2 and s2,
linked by an edge of weight 1. There are two shared
edges, between b1 and s2, and between b2 and s1: both
edges have weight 1pb − ε. Algorithm APPROX returns
the matching M ={[b1, s1], [b2, s2]} with weight 2 in
G′ because the weight of {[b1, s2], [b2, s1]} in G′ is
2(1− pbε) < 2. The optimal solution would have been
M∗MOA = {[b1, s2], [b2, s1]}. The ratio between the
weights of these two solutions is w(M)w(M∗
MOA
)=
2
2/pb−2ε
,
which tends towards pb when ε tends towards 0.
Theorem 4 implies that the price of stability of MOA
defined as the maximum, over all the instances, of
w(M∗MOA)/w(M
∗) is at least pb. In fact, we are able
to prove that PoS= pb.
Proposition 3. The price of stability is pb.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4 that
w(M∗cont)/w(M
∗) ≥ pb since APPROX returns a
matching M such that w(M∗MOA) ≥ w(M) ≥
pbw(M
∗).
Let us now show that this bound is tight. There are
two organizations: organization O1, which owns two
vertices b1 and s1, linked by an edge of weight W1,
and organization O2, which owns one vertex s2, linked
to b1 by a link of weight W2. Suppose that W1 = ε
such that 0 < ε < 1 and W2 = 1 when pb = 0.
The ratio w(M
∗
cont)
w(M∗) = ε, tends towards 0 = pb when
ε tends towards 0. Suppose that W1 = 1 and W2 =
1/pb − ε such that 0 < ε < 1/pb − 1 when pb > 0.
The ratio w(M
∗
cont)
w(M∗) =
pb
1−ε pb
, tends towards pb when ε
tends towards 0.
We can prove that Theorem 4 is best possible if
P 6=NP, i.e. we cannot obtain a (pb + ε)-approximation
for all ε > 0. Actually, we prove a slightly stronger
result where n denotes the number of vertices.
Theorem 5. For any polynomial P , it is NP-hard to
obtain a (pb+ 1Θ(2P(n)) )-approximation for MOA where
at least three organizations are involved.
Proof. We describe a gap reduction. We start with an
instance of PARTITION given by a set of n integers
{a1, . . . , an} such that
∑n
i=1 ai = 2W . For any real
t > 1, we construct an instance It of MOA as follows:
• we are given 3 organizations O1, O2 and O3.
• O1 has n + 1 buyers and n + 1 sellers respectively
denoted by b1,i and s1,i for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
• O2 has 2 buyers denoted by b2,1, b2,n+1 and n + 1
sellers denoted by s2,i for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
• O3 has one seller s3,1.
• The edge set of the underlying graph is {[s1,i, b1,i],
[b1,i, s2,i] : i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {[s1,n+1, b2,1]}∪
{[b1,n+1, s2,n+1], [s2,n+1, b2,n+1], [b2,n+1, s3,1]}
The weights are given by:
• w([s1,i, b1,i]) = w([b1,i, s2,i]) = ai for i = 1, . . . , n.
120 Laurent Gourve`s et al. – Cooperation in multiorganization matching
• w([s1,n+1, b2,1]) = psW , w([b1,n+1, s2,n+1]) =
psW , w([s2,n+1, b2,n+1]) = tpbW + 2psW , and
w([b2,n+1, s3,1]) = tW .
An illustration of this construction is given in Figure 4.
If t = O(2P (|V |)) where |V | = 3n+6 is the order of
the underlying graph, then it is not difficult to see that
the above construction is given within polynomial time.
The profits the organizations can make on their own
are respectively w1(M˜) = (ps + pb)
∑n
i=1 ai = 2W ,
w2(M˜) = (ps + pb)(tpbW +2psW ) = tpbW +2psW
and w3(M˜) = 0.
We prove that there are only two distinct values
for the optimal value of MOA, that are OPT(It) =
tpbW+3psW+2W orOPT (It) = tW+2psW+2W ,
and OPT (It) = tW + 2psW + 2W if and only if
{a1, . . . , an} admits a partition.
Observe that tW +2psW +2W > tpbW +3psW +
2W if and only if t > 1 since pb = 1− ps and ps > 0.
Let M∗cont be an optimal solution of MOA (with value
OPT (It)). Let us consider two cases:
Case [s2,n+1, b2,n+1] ∈ M∗cont. An optimal solution
can be described by {[s1,i, b1,i] : i = 1, . . . , n}∪
{[s1,n+1, b2,1], [s2,n+1, b2,n+1]}.Actually, [s1,n+1, b2,1]
∈ M∗cont because M∗cont is maximal by Prop-
erty 1 (cf page 115). Moreover, the weight of
any maximal matching on the graph induced by
{s1,i, b1,i, s2,i : i = 1, . . . , n} has the same value 2W .
In this case, we get OPT (It) = tpbW +3psW +2W .
Case [s2,n+1, b2,n+1] /∈M∗cont. Edges {[b1,n+1, s2,n+1],
[b2,n+1, s3,1], [s1,n+1, b2,1]} belong to M∗cont by Prop-
erty 1. The contribution of these 3 edges to the profit
of O2 is psw([b1,n+1, s2,n+1]) + pbw([b2,n+1, s3,1]) +
pbw([s1,n+1, b2,1]) = tpbW+psW < tpbW+2psW =
w([s2,n+1, b2,n+1]) since ps > 0. Hence, a subset
of shared edges between O1 and O2 must belong to
M∗cont. Let J∗ = {j ≤ n : [b1,j , s2,j] ∈ M∗cont}
be this subset. Then, M∗cont is entirely described
by {[b1,n+1, s2,n+1], [b2,n+1, s3,1], [s1,n+1, b2,1]} ∪
{[b1,j, s2,j] : j ∈ J
∗} ∪ {[s1,j, b1,j , ] : j /∈ J
∗}.
To be feasible, M∗cont must satisfy w1(M∗cont) ≥
w(M˜1), i.e.
∑
j /∈J∗ aj+pb
∑
j∈J∗ aj+(ps+pb)psW ≥∑n
j=1 aj from which we deduce W ≥
∑
j∈J∗ aj be-
cause pb = 1 − ps and ps > 0. M∗ must also sat-
isfy w2(M∗cont) ≥ w(M˜2), i.e. ps
∑
j∈J∗ aj + (ps +
pb)psW + tpbW ≥ tpbW + 2psW , which is equiva-
lent to
∑
j∈J∗ aj ≥ W . Then, we obtain
∑
j∈J∗ aj =∑
j /∈J∗ aj = W . On the one hand OPT (It) = tW +
2psW +2W and on the other hand {a1, . . . , an} has a
partition given by J∗.
Conversely, if {a1, . . . , an} admits a partition then it
is not difficult to prove that OPT (It) = tW +2psW +
2W .
Now, assume that there is a (pb + 1c2P(|V |) )-
approximation of MOA given within polynomial time
for some c > 0. Consider t0 = 5c2P (|V |) and let
apx(It0 ) denote the value of the approximate solution
on instance It0 .
• {a1, . . . , an} does not admit a partition. One has
OPT (It0) = 5c2
P (|V |)pbW +3psW +2W and then
apx(It0 ) ≤ 5c2
P (|V |)pbW + 3psW + 2W .
• {a1, . . . , an} admits a partition. We haveOPT (It0) =
5c2P (|V |)W + 2psW + 2W . Since apx(It0 ) ≥
(pb +
1
c2P (|V |)
)OPT (It0) by hypothesis and ps ≤ 1,
we deduce apx(It0) > 5W + 5c2P (|V |)pbW ≥
5c2P (|V |)pbW + 3psW + 2W .
In conclusion, apx allows us to distinguish within
polynomial time whether {a1, . . . , an} has a partition
or not, which is impossible if P 6=NP.
4. MOA and multicriteria matching problems
This section deals with the design of exact or ap-
proximate algorithms for MOA with two organizations
(q = 2). We relate here MOA to multicriteria matching
problems, and we present a conditionnal result as we did
in Proposition 1 (where we have linked the complexity
of MOA with two organizations and weights polynomi-
ally bounded to the complexity of EXACTPM).
We relate MOA to the k-criteria matching problem
where each edge is evaluated with k cost functions (also
called criteria) f1, . . . , fk. In this case, the cost of a
matching for the criterium fi is the sum of the values of
the criterium fi for every edge in the matching. The goal
is then to find the set S of the solutions such that s ∈ S if
there is no solution better than s on all the criteria simul-
taneously. An approximate solution is a matching which
is on all the criteria (1 − ε)-approximate of a solution
s ∈ S. In [16], Papadimitriou and Yannakakis show that
the k−criteria matching problem admits a fully polyno-
mial RNC scheme. In [18] Przybylski, Gandibleux and
Ehrgott propose an efficient exact method when k = 2
and the graph is bipartite (this problem is also called
biobjective or bicriteria assignment problem). More re-
cently Berger, Bonifaci, Grandoni and Scha¨fer [4] pro-
posed a PTAS for a budgeted version of the matching
problem which is equivalent to the biobjective matching
problem. We now show how to turn an instance of MOA
with two organizations into an instance of the biobjec-
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Fig. 4. The instance It resulting from the above reduction
tive assignment problem. Next we exploit the results
given in [4] and [18].
An instance of the biobjective assignment problem
is composed of a simple graph G = (V,E) and two
functions f : E → R+ and s : E → R+. Then a
matching M has two values f(M) =
∑
e∈M f(e) and
s(M) =
∑
e∈M s(e). Given an instance of MOA with
two organizations, one builds a corresponding instance
of the biobjective assignment problem as follows. The
graph (vertex and edge sets) remains unchanged. Let
us define f and s for an edge e = [u, v]. If u, v ∈ O1
then f(e) = w(e) and s(e) = 0. If u, v ∈ O2 then
s(e) = w(e) and f(e) = 0. If u ∈ B ∩ O1 and v ∈
S ∩ O2 then f(e) = pbw(e) and s(e) = psw(e). If
u ∈ S ∩ O1 and v ∈ B ∩ O2 then f(e) = psw(e) and
s(e) = pbw(e). Therefore, we have w1(M) = f(M)
andw2(M) = s(M) for allM ∈M. It is not difficult to
see that the exact algorithm of Przybylski, Gandibleux
and M. Ehrgott [18] can be used to solve instances of
MOA with two organizations.
Berger et al. [4] study the following problem
Π(B) maximize f(M)
such that: M ∈M
s(M) ≤ B
where B is a given non negative budget and M is the
set of all feasible matchings. The problem is called
max-min budgeted matching. Let M∗ be an optimum to
Π(B). Berger et al. present a PTAS, i.e. they are able
to compute in polynomial time a feasible solution Mˆ
such that s(Mˆ) ≤ B and f(Mˆ) ≥ (1 − ε)f(M∗) for
all ε ∈ (0, 1).
Let us define two versions of the max-max budgeted
matching.
Π′(B) maximize f(M)
such that: M ∈M
s(M) ≥ B
Π′′(B) maximize s(M)
such that: M ∈M
f(M) ≥ B
Let A′ (resp. A′′) be a PTAS for Π′(B) (resp.
Π′′(B)). In the sequel, A′(B, ε) and A′′(B, ε) de-
note the execution of A′ and A′′ for a given budget
B and a fixed parameter ε ∈ (0, 1), respectively. In
particular, A′(B, ε) returns a matching M such that
s(M) ≥ B and f(M) ≥ (1 − ε)f(M∗) where M∗
denotes an optimum solution to Π′(B). Similarly,
A′′(B, ε) returns a matching M such that f(M) ≥ B
and s(M) ≥ (1 − ε)f(M∗∗) where M∗∗ denotes an
optimum solution to Π′′(B).
In the sequel, (G,w) denotes the instance of MOA
while (G′, f, s) denotes the corresponding instance of
max-max budgeted matching.
Algorithm 2 takes as input ε and an instance of MOA
and returns a (1 − ε)-approximate solution of MOA
for this instance. It consists in iteratively computing a
(1−ε)-approximate solution for the corresponding max-
max budgeted matching problem with a budget slowly
decreasing until a solution of MOA is found.
Theorem 6. There is a PTAS for MOA with two orga-
nizations (q = 2) if there is a PTAS for the max-max
budgeted matching problem.
Proof. Let us consider Algorithm 2. As usual we sup-
pose that w(M) ≤ 2P (n) for some polynomial P . Here
n is the number of vertices andM is any feasible match-
ing. We deduce that R+ 1 ≤ P (n). Then Algorithm 2
is polynomial because A′ and A′′ are polynomial and
A′ is executed R+ 1 times.
Case A: If wi(M∗MOA) ≤ wi(M˜)/(1 − ε) holds
for i = 1, 2 then M˜ is a (1 − ε)-approximation of
M∗MOA because w(M˜) = w1(M˜) + w2(M˜) ≥ (1 −
ε)
(
w1(M
∗
MOA) + w2(M
∗
MOA)
)
= (1− ε)w(M∗MOA).
In addition, M˜ is by definition a feasible solution to
MOA.
Case B: If w1(M∗MOA) ≤ w1(M˜)/(1 − ε) and
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Algorithm 2:
Input: (G,w) instance of MOA, (G′, f, s) the
corresponding instance of max-max
budgeted matching and ε ∈ (0, 1)
Output: a feasible (1− ε)-approximate solution Mˆ
Compute M∗ and M˜ on (G,w);
Mˆ := M˜ ;
Execute A′′(w1(M˜), ε) and denote by M ′′ the
resulting matching;
if
(
wi(M
′′) ≥ wi(M˜), i = 1, 2
)
∧
(
w(M ′′) >
w(Mˆ)
)
then
Mˆ ←M ′′;
end
R :=
⌈
log(w2(M˜))−log(w(M
∗))
log(1−ε)
⌉
;
for r = 0 to R do
Execute A′(max{(1− ε)rw(M∗), w2(M˜)}, ε)
and denote by M r the resulting matching;
if
(
wi(M
r) ≥ wi(M˜), i = 1, 2
)
∧
(
w(M r) >
w(Mˆ)
)
then
Mˆ ←M r;
end
end
Return Mˆ ;
w2(M
∗
MOA) > w2(M˜)/(1 − ε) then we are going to
show that M ′′ is a (1 − ε)-approximation of M∗MOA.
Let M be an optimal solution to Π′′(w1(M˜)). Since
A′′ is (1 − ε)-approximate and M∗MOA is a feasible
solution to Π′′(w1(M˜)),
w2(M
′′) ≥ (1− ε)w2(M) ≥ (1− ε)w2(M
∗
MOA) (4)
holds. We know that
w1(M
′′) ≥ w1(M˜) (5)
holds becauseM ′′ is a feasible solution to Π′′(w1(M˜)).
Inequality (4) and w2(M∗MOA) > w2(M˜)/(1− ε) give
w2(M
′′) > w2(M˜). (6)
We deduce from inequalities (5) and (6) that M ′′
is a feasible solution to MOA. Inequality (5) and
w1(M
∗
MOA) ≤ w1(M˜)/(1− ε) lead to
w1(M
′′) ≥ (1− ε)w1(M
∗
MOA). (7)
Therefore inequalities (4) and (7) give w(M ′′) ≥ (1−
ε)w(M∗MOA).
Case C: Suppose that
w1(M
∗
MOA) > w1(M˜)/(1− ε) (8)
holds. In the loop of Algorithm 2, A′ is executed with
a budget which ranges from (1− ε)0w(M∗) = w(M∗)
to max{w2(M˜), (1− ε)Rw(M∗)}. We know that (1−
ε)Rw(M∗) ≤ w2(M˜) because
R := ⌈
(
log(w2(M˜))− log(w(M
∗))
)
/ log(1− ε)⌉.
Since w2(M˜) ≤ w2(M∗MOA) ≤ w(M∗MOA) ≤
w(M∗), there exists r∗ ∈ [0, R] such that
max{w2(M˜), (1− ε)
r∗w(M∗)} ≤ w2(M
∗
MOA)
< (1 − ε)r
∗−1w(M∗). (9)
Let M be an optimum solution to
Π′
(
max{w2(M˜), (1 − ε)r
∗
w(M∗)}
)
. We know that
M r
∗ is a (1 − ε)-approximation of M . By definition,
w1(M
r∗) ≥ (1 − ε)w1(M) and w2(M r
∗
) ≥ (1 −
ε)r
∗
w(M∗) hold. Using inequality (9) we know that
(1− ε)w2(M
∗
MOA) < (1− ε)
r∗w(M∗). We deduce
w2(M
r∗) ≥ (1 − ε)r
∗
w(M∗) > (1− ε)w2(M
∗
MOA).
(10)
Since M∗MOA is a feasible solution to
Π′
(
max{w2(M˜), (1 − ε)r
∗
w(M∗)}
)
, w1(M) ≥
w1(M
∗
MOA) and
w1(M
r∗) ≥ (1− ε)w1(M) ≥ (1− ε)w1(M
∗
MOA)
(11)
Using (10) and (11) we get w(M r∗) ≥ (1 −
ε)w(M∗MOA). Using (8) and (11) we get
w1(M
r∗) > w1(M˜).
Sincew2(M r
∗
) ≥ max{w2(M˜), (1−ε)r
∗
w(M∗)} ≥
w2(M˜), M
r∗ is a feasible (1−ε)-approximate solution
to MOA.
Unfortunately, we were not able to build A′ and A′′.
However Berger [5] provides a weaker result : a mod-
ification of Berger et al.’s result yields a polynomial
time algorithm which outputs a matching M satisfy-
ing s(M) ≥ (1 − εˆ)B and f(M) ≥ (1 − ε)f(M∗)
where M∗ denotes an optimum solution to Π′(B) and
εˆ, ε ∈ (0, 1).
5. Generalizations
5.1. Relaxation of the selfishness of the organizations
Suppose that each organizationOi accepts a proposed
global matching if its own profit is at least w(M˜i)/x
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where x ≥ 1 is fixed. This means that each organization
accepts to divide by x the profit it would have without
sharing its file with the other organizations. The prob-
lem, denoted by MOA(x) is then to find a maximum
weight matching M such that wi(M) ≥ w(M˜i)/x for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , q}. Let M∗cont(x) denote such a maxi-
mum weight matching.
If x = 1, an organization does not accept to reduce
its profit, and this problem is the one stated in the intro-
duction. If x ≥ 1/pb, the organizations accept to divide
their profits by 1/pb. Property 2 page 118 shows that in
a maximum weight matching M∗, the profit of organi-
zation Oi is at least pb w(M˜i). Thus M∗cont(x) = M
∗
.
Our aim is now to solve MOA(x) for 1 ≤ x < 1/pb.
With a slight modification of the proof of Theorem 1,
we can show that this problem is strongly NP-hard for
each value x smaller than 1/pb. One can also extend
APPROX to a slightly modified algorithm 2 APPROX(x)
and prove that it is (x pb)-approximate algorithm for
MOA(x) and this bound is tight. In addition, the price
of stability is x pb for this generalization.
5.2. General graphs
One can extend MOA to general graphs when ps =
pb = 1/2. In this case, the distinction between buyers
and sellers is lost. For example, the problem has the fol-
lowing application: Numerous web sites offer to con-
duct home exchanges during holidays. The concept is
simple, instead of booking expensive hotel rooms, pairs
of families agree to swap their houses for a vacation.
We model the situation with a graphG = (V,E) whose
vertices are candidates for house exchange. The ver-
tex set is partitioned into q sets/organizationsO1 . . . Oq .
Vertices within an organization are its clients. Every
edge [a, b] ∈ E has a weight w([a, b]) representing the
satisfaction of candidates a and b if they swap. Pairs
are formed by the organizations which only care about
the satisfaction of their clients. In case of a mixed-
organizations exchange [a, b], it is assumed that the sat-
isfaction of both participants is w([a, b])/2. The prob-
lem is to maximize the collective satisfaction while no
organization is penalized.
Theorems 3 to 5 and Proposition 3 (where pb is re-
placed by 1/2) hold for general graphs since the proofs
do not use the fact that G is bipartite.
2 The weight of shared edges is multiplied by xpb instead
of pb.
6. Conclusion
We studied cooperation, at an algorithmic level, be-
tween organizations. We showed that the price of sta-
bility is pb, and we studied the complexity of MOA. We
presented polynomial cases, and showed that the prob-
lem is NP-hard in the general case. We also gave an ap-
proximation algorithm, matching the inapproximation
bound when there are at least 3 organizations. There
remain some open problems: is it possible to have an
algorithm with a better approximation ratio when there
are two organizations3 ? Is this problem strongly NP-
hard in this case (we notice that this problem is related
to the open Exact Perfect Matching problem)? When
we consider that each organization accepts a solution if
it does not reduce its profit by a factor larger than x, is
it possible to get an algorithm with an approximation
ratio better than x pb (with 1 ≤ x < 1/pb)? An inter-
esting direction would also be to study fairness issues
in this problem. For example, among all the solutions
of the same quality, return the one which maximizes
the minimum wi(Mcont) − M˜i, that is the minimum
increase of profit of the organizations.
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